The Case For Change

Diana's Offer Delivers Certain, Premium Value in Cash

$23.50

per share

1.0x1

NAV

31%

premium over undisturbed price

The Genco Board Has Chosen Entrenchment Over Engagement

For six months, the Genco Board of Directors has rebuffed all invitations to meet with Diana to discuss our fully financed, all-cash offer. Instead of engaging, the Genco Board has entrenched itself through a series of shareholder-unfriendly governance actions and issued misleading statements designed to distract shareholders from the certain, premium value on the table. The reason is clear: engaging with Diana could jeopardize the Board and management's ability to continue leading Genco and collecting their outsized pay packages.


This is not how a public company board should conduct itself — and it is time for wholesale change on the Genco Board.

How to Vote

The Genco Board Has Failed Its Shareholders

The Genco Board's actions reflect not a commitment to shareholders' best interests, but a singular focus on preserving their own roles and compensation. Shareholders now have the opportunity to effect change at Genco by electing six independent directors committed to evaluating all value-maximizing alternatives — including Diana's $23.50 per share all-cash offer — on the merits.

We encourage Genco shareholders to consider the following at this important time:

Outsized Compensation and Misaligned Incentives

Despite a net loss and five consecutive years of declining EBITDA, CEO John Wobensmith's "compensation actually paid" in 2025 rose to $5,945,310, the highest figure in Genco's five-year Pay Versus Performance table. The Genco Board made this possible by quietly replacing Free Cash Flow with a more forgiving bonus metric after management missed its targets. When management also missed its return on invested capital ("ROIC") performance target — achieving just 6.20% against a 7.00% goal — the Board lowered the bar rather than hold executives accountable, awarding 2025 performance-based vesting RSUs (PRSUs) with a target range of just 4.00%–5.00% ROIC. This pattern of self-enrichment is not new: in 2014, the year Genco filed for Chapter 11, Wobensmith received more than $17.50 million in compensation, and since 2021 he has sold approximately $11.50 million in Genco stock. Genco is now asking shareholders to approve a 35.00% increase in its executive incentive plan pool and hand a disproportionate share to Wobensmith, who has already received 69.00% of all options, 40.00% of all RSUs and 53.00% of all PRSUs granted under Genco's 2015 Incentive Plan.

Lack of Independence

The Genco Board's independence problems are pervasive and well-documented. For instance, Compensation Committee Chair Basil Mavroleon has served on the Genco Board since 2005 and chairs the committee overseeing executive pay as a so-called "independent" director, despite longstanding financial and personal ties to CEO John Wobensmith through the merchant bank where Wobensmith previously worked. Under the leadership of his friend Mavroleon, the Compensation Committee has lavished extraordinary pay on Wobensmith dating back to Genco's 2014 bankruptcy. It is wholly inappropriate that the CEO's compensation is set by someone so deeply connected to him outside of Genco.

Misaligned Interests

The decisions being made at the expense of Genco shareholders are being made by a board with virtually no financial stake in the outcome. Three Genco directors — including, incredibly, Lead Independent Director Kathleen Haines, who is supposed to serve as the primary check on the CEO — each beneficially own zero shares of Genco common stock. Mavroleon himself, after more than two decades on the Board, beneficially owns just 739 shares of Genco stock — a figure that represents the entire beneficial ownership of the compensation committee's members combined. Directors who own no shares in the company they govern have no personal interest in the decisions they make on shareholders' behalf. A board whose members do not share in the consequences of their own decisions is a board that answers to itself — not to shareholders.

Poison Pill

The Genco Board unilaterally adopted a poison pill and subsequently amended it to lower the triggering threshold to 10% — specifically designed to prevent Diana from acquiring additional shares and deny shareholders the opportunity to decide for themselves whether our offer represents compelling value. The pill's "qualifying offer" provision, which in theory allows shareholders to act on a legitimate offer independent of the board, is illusory: it imposes twelve separate conditions that must all be satisfied. The pill also uses "daisy chain" ownership concepts that Delaware courts have labeled "extreme." Despite asking shareholders to vote on the pill, the Genco Board expressly retains full authority to amend or extend it unilaterally, regardless of the outcome.

Employee Retention Plan

Just 28 days after our proxy contest began, the Genco Board approved an "Employee Retention Plan" providing $11.26 million in cash severance and $16.70 million in accelerated equity — approximately $0.64 per share — to its four named executive officers, plus an undisclosed additional amount to other employees. This is not a retention plan — it is a severance plan. It pays out only if control changes, specifically if 50% of the Board is replaced rather than the customary majority threshold, or if someone acquires the company. For Wobensmith, it functions as an effective single-trigger severance arrangement. The plan was initially disclosed without identifying participants, costs, or terms — and was only provided to Diana after its lawyers made a formal demand. Genco continues to resist disclosing the plan's full cost to shareholders.

Undisclosed Special Committee

In January 2026, the Genco Board announced the formation of a Committee of Independent Directors to evaluate Diana's proposals and consider strategic alternatives — without disclosing its members or legal counsel. Six months later, the committee has taken no visible action to advance shareholder value and Genco continues to withhold its composition. It appears designed not to evaluate strategic alternatives in good faith, but to provide the Board with a shield against accountability while running out the clock on a compelling, fully financed offer.

The Case for Change is Compelling — Take Back Control of Your Investment Now


As Genco's largest shareholder, Diana's interests are fully aligned with yours — and you deserve better stewards of your investment. Please join us in effecting change at Genco by voting the GOLD universal proxy card "FOR" each of our six independent nominees — Gustave Brun-Lie, Paul Cornell, Chao Sih Hing Francois, Jens Ismar, Viktoria Poziopoulou and Quentin Soanes — and "WITHHOLD" on Genco's nominees.

Each of Diana’s nominees is committed to ensuring every strategic alternative for delivering shareholder value is fully and fairly considered.

How to Vote
1 Based on Genco fleet values reported by Genco in its fourth quarter 2025 presentation.

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